Lingering effects in post-cartel pricing
5 October 2026
In this article, we look at lingering effects in post-cartel pricing.
We review the evidence on lingering effects, explore why they may arise, discuss the factors that make them more likely and set forth recommendations to help antitrust policy give due consideration to them.
After a cartel ends, its effects on prices may persist, sometimes for an extended period. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as ‘lingering effects’ (also ‘overhang effects’).
Lingering effects are not uncommon and may arise for a variety of reasons, including post-cartel tacit collusion, strategic incentives to keep post-cartel prices high, or adjustment costs and other frictions contributing to cartel price persistence after the cartel’s collapse.
When lingering effects are relevant, the harm caused by a cartel persists after the cartel’s dissolution.
We highlight two key implications:
First, there is a risk of underestimating private damages and undercompensating cartel victims. Commonly used empirical approaches that rely on post-cartel prices to quantify damages would tend to underestimate the overcharge. Further, awards of damages arising from lingering effects are still very uncommon: compensation typically covers the ‘official’ cartel period only. This could further reduce compensation.
Second, there is a risk of undermining antitrust deterrence. Antitrust fines are usually calculated on the basis of revenues during the ‘official’ cartel period. Hence, they do not consider collusive profits arising from lingering effects. This is likely to weaken the deterrent effect of such fines. Moreover, if private damages were understated, this would further weaken deterrence.
To deter cartels more effectively, we believe that antitrust policy should give due consideration to lingering effects. We set out several recommendations to achieve this goal:
First, courts should consider biases stemming from lingering effects when scrutinising alternative methods to quantify damages.
Second, courts should award damages caused by lingering effects when these have been demonstrated by sound evidence.
Third, competition authorities should envisage ways to consider lingering effects when setting fines for cartel infringements.
Fourth, competition authorities should enhance their remedy toolkit to mitigate post-cartel tacit collusion..